The main thing needed for understanding the recent Obama-Netanyahu transactions, in my view, is the six principles outlined by Netanyahu in his speech in the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) last week:
I also believe that most people are united in regard to my viewpoints on the issue that seems to be in dispute, the political process with the Palestinians. The citizens of Israel are much more united than is commonly believed, and much more united than the political parties that are supposed to represent them here in this house. There is consensus regarding the basic issues:
First, about my demand that the Palestinians recognize the State of Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people.
Second, about my view, which is shared by many here, that the agreement between us must end the conflict and end the demands on the State of Israel.
Third, that the problem of the Palestinian refugees will be resolved outside of Israel and not within its borders.
Fourth, that a Palestinian state only be established under a peace treaty that will not compromise the safety of Israel. I believe there is agreement on this, and I stress that this state must be demilitarized, with practical security arrangements, including long-term IDF presence along the Jordan River.
Fifth, we agree that we must maintain the settlement blocs. There is widespread agreement that the settlement blocs must remain within the State of Israel.
Sixth, that Jerusalem remain the united and sovereign capital of the State of Israel.
These are the principles that guide my path, our path.
(Quoted from the Israeli MFA’s website)
President Obama’s speech at the State Department accepted most of these points. The tension, if any, remains in the major issue of borders: the President’s mention of the 1967 borders, which contradict the demand for keeping the settlement blocs in Israel. At the same time, however, it is clear that when Premier Netanyahu specifies the blocs he is excluding the settlements outside of these blocs, thus theoretically agreeing to withdrawing from most of the West Bank. Furthermore, compensation for the loss of the land of the blocs is not off the table. The views are not irreconcilable.
We can assume that the American President is not invested in the precise compromise concerning Jerusalem and the refugee problem, as long as there is one. Obama wisely stressed that it is ultimately the responsibility of the Israeli and Palestinian parties to reach a settlement. I am certain this emphasis will not deter those who expect to see severe US pressure towards an agreement, and rest assured that the President will not venture into such futile efforts.
On much more important points, however, the President accepts the Israeli demands, and reaffirms them: Netanyahu’s fourth principle is intended to delegitimize a unilateral move of the Palestinians, namely a UN resolution in the coming September. Obama stressed that such efforts will lead them nowhere, assuring Israel that the US will not support such a declaration of independence. We should bear in mind that while Netanyahu would like to be remembered as one who opposed the disengagement and resigning over it from government, he did vote in favour of it before submitting his resignation.
I consider the President’s commitment to a “Jewish and Democratic” state implies a principal agreement to the Israeli refusal to house Palestinian refugees, and likewise his emphasis on the security arrangements assure that despite any romantic fantasies peace-activists may have of a full, one-toime withdrawal, Israel’s presence in the West Bank will linger many years after a Peace agreement is reached. Complex and in-depth examinations of Time and Space are necessary for understanding the conflict properly.
People are baffled:
1. How can Obama be so supportive of Israel if he is a Muslim?
2. If Obama accepts so much of Netanyahu’s terms, why the tension? Why didn’t Netanyahu just wait to hear a Palestinian objection before raising his own qualifications and dissent?
The first question is tongue-in-cheek of course, but it has a serious side to it. Obama’s detractors never miss an opportunity to slur. When he’s against Israel, it’s because he is a Muslim, and Israeli pundits use his middle name time and again, as if bearing an Arabic name is a fault. When he outlines a pragmatic peace plan, albeit without specifications, they claim that the Westerner doesn’t understand the Middle-East. So which is it going to be? Is he the WASP that can’t understand the Middle-East, as every president and State-Dept-Secretary before him, or is he the Arab-Muslim who hates Israel?
Naturally, my answer is neither, but right-wing Israelis will have no problem holding both, interchangeably.
The second question is partially answered by Netanyahu’s needs at home. Gallantly fighting the American emperor for the fate of the Jewish people is always a good caricature for his right-wing partners in the coalition and their support base. But it is also a very basic negotiation move: Obama has already agreed to most of Netanyahu’s terms. He has America on his side. Saying that he accepts the speech as fair, and responding to most of his concerns, would make him lose on two aspects: first, it would reaffirm the old notion of the US as an unfair broker for an Israeli-Palestinian peace, as it is partial on Israel’s behalf; second, Netanyahu would lose any chance of making the US raise its offer. Netanyahu’s disappointed response therefore provides both President Obama and President Abbas with a little rope, allowing them to portray the US as putting pressure on Israel. At the same time, we may speculate that when the door closed behind them, Obama and Netanyahu didn’t suffice in mocking the media for falling for it and exchanging friendly remarks. Netanyahu continued to stage his stance for the President, allowing the President to make some security offers that had not been raised previously.
This means that Netanyahu might very well be prepared to reach a deal based on a two-state solution model. Does this mean there will be peace? Of course not. The problems only begin here. But first we need to see if an agreement is reached, before we start worrying about that. History shows us that both sides have too many concerns to allow them to reach a deal: the Palestinian leadership can’t afford to fold the “Right of Return” flag; the Israelis dread the moment of evacuation of West Bank Settlements’ extremists. Both sides will not easily make a compromise in Jerusalem.
