Three Simple Steps towards a Two-State Solution

Prime-Minister Netanyahu’s statement that the current round of negotiations might culminate in an interim agreement is a good point to stop and think of the meaning and difference between a “final solution” / comprehensive agreement and an interim one.

Before expanding on this point, a note to the perplexed who fail to understand why Netanyahu does not fire Lieberman, where does he stand in relation to the peace-process and so forth: if one stops to try and reconcile the opposing statements of Lieberman and Netanyahu, but rather examines the situation in its entirety, things are less perplexing. Yes, Netanyahu originally said he is willing to reach a final agreement with a Palestinian state. But before that he said he was not willing to sit with Tzipi Livni in the same government, because she required that he expresses his support for a two-state solution. And still, even after Netanyahu has done so, the two refuse to serve together in government. And then the Labor party ministers claim, now and again, that if no progress is made, they will resign. And they haven’t, to date. So all the talk of Netanyahu being “unable” due to “political constraints” is not convincing. Instead, this is precisely the policy: state your support of a two-state solution, then put every possible obstacle, then regret your failure to reach it. How many times have we heard that the Prime-Minister was “this close” to cutting a deal, but elections got in the way of reaching true peace? Barak and the Taba talks, no, Rabin-Peres before that, then Barak, then Olmert, and I suspect we’re going to hear the same tune once Netanyahu is out of office (or not, because it’s Netanyahu).

So, why not reach an agreement? The reality of the conflict is that it cannot be resolved. The partition of Jerusalem and Return of Refugees are two delicate topics, no-one is willing to commit. The problem of the refugees is more obvious than Jerusalem: whatever compromise is reached, cannot be assured to be final. So Israel’s fear is that it agrees to a two-state, dismantles settlements, divides Jerusalem, allows for a “humanitarian-symbolic” return of 10,000 or 100,000 refugees. Then what? What does Israel have to offer when ten years later a terrorist group demands that refugees be allowed to return to their homes in Jaffa, Asdud, Majdal, Safed, Lud and so forth? Now, we can be naïve and say that Israel will not have to offer anything, because the conflict has been resolved, but there are more chances for people coming to accept that Israel still has not paid for its wrongdoings, than retaining a historical memory of the elevation when the “final accord” was signed. Hence, it is always better to reach an interim agreement, which allows to postpone the refugee problem, rather than reaching a compromise and dealing with the fear of future demands.

There is a way out of this, but as an Israeli I am not comfortable in stating it, because it means laying most of the responsibility with the Palestinians. So before I describe my solution, I will add this note of self-awareness: as an Israeli, one grows up with the sense that “we” want peace, and if the “Arabs” weren’t so obstinate and malicious, we could have peace by now. I’m not claiming that I participated in explicit hate lessons, but you grow up assuming that your side is the “good guys” and whoever the political enemy is, will also be viewed as the “bad guys”. I’m sure it’s the same for the Palestinians, especially those living under the injustice of the occupation. So, yes, I am going to say here something that might sound childish in that sense (“if they help us solve it, it will be okay”). I feel I have legitimacy to do this, especially because my stance of the occupation and disenfranchisement of Palestinian rights is that it is wrong, and that it should stop regardless of the peace process, and even in light of some security risks which Israel has to assume. So while I think that there is a crucial element of the peace process which is much more in the hands of the Palestinians than the Israelis, I think there is much more in the hands of the Israelis in terms of human rights and conflict alleviation which the Israeli government could do, even unilaterally, even if it does not promote peace in the short-term.

As for my suggestion: there are three major steps that I think the Arabs can do to relax Israeli concerns, and naturally, they are intertwined. The first regards the Arab Initiative. The fact that the Arab League has stated it is backing off its famous Khartoum resolution, and is willing to make peace with Israel is great. The fact that they conditioned this on the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is regrettable. This is the most intricate and complex aspect of the Israeli-Arab conflict to solve, and it feeds on mutual feelings of mistrust, nurtured, among other things, by Israeli experience as being isolated in the region. Embassies of Saudi-Arabia, Lybia, Tunisia, Morroco, UAE and others in Tel Aviv will do a great service to alleviate this. If you can add Syria and Iraq into this, it is even a dream. Having all of these embassies in Israel, encouraging Israeli tourism to Damascus and Tripoli, being involved in Israeli culture, attending gala events, TV shows and more, will weaken the Israeli stance of suspicion. I realize this is a naïve view, since Saudi-Arabia is an repressive theocracy, and will not engage in bringing heathens to Mekka, for example. But I think it is less naïve than the allegedly dream-package deal of the Arab League (“just solve this minute conflict with the Palestinians and we’ll stand in line to open embassies in Tel Aviv”). It makes more sense the other way around: open the embassies in Tel Aviv, the Palestinian cause will seem less frightening.

The second aspect of this concern is the refugee problem. Everyone knows that the refugees of 1948 will not be allowed to return to their homes, most of which are long gone. Instead of holding on to them as a valuable card in the negotiation, Palestinian leadership should recognize the disservice this problem is causing for the resolution of the whole conflict. Therefore, it should first be solved practically, without involving Israel. Then, negotiations over compensations will be much easier. As Jews we know too well that there is no way to undo a wrongdoing or to compensate for it properly. A victim should not seek compensation or undoing, but instead means to help him move on. Yes, I am thinking of German reparations to Holocaust survivors; no, I am not equating the Nakbah and the Holocaust. German reparations are not intended to undo the evils of the Holocaust, because there is no way to undo them. But there are technical and practical needs of victims which can and should be addressed. Not to clear the past, but to pave a path for the future. This is what Israeli nationalists such as Begin failed to understand when opposing the agreement. And in application to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Israel cannot and will not repatriate displaced Palestinians. Solutions should be made wherever the refugees are located now, and then Israel can follow suit with monetary compensation. This is not only the practical solution for the refugee problem, it is also the moral one. Eventually, if my suggestion here is adopted, it will assist immensely in diminishing Israeli fears that acknowledging the Nakbah and taking responsibility for it will pose a threat. If the only consequence is money, it is much more easy to face, and this makes this suggestion also the most achievable. Refugees living in Palestinian territories will be allowed to relocate anywhere within the Palestinian territory, and special projects will be funded by Israel for improvement of residential conditions of refugees in Gaza and the West Bank.

Finally, the third element is the fear that following a two-state solution, Palestinians will demand representation in Israel as a non-Jewish state, and/or will demand autonomy in largely populated Palestinian areas such as the Galilee and the “Triangle”.

Netanyahu has tried to address this concern by demanding a Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state. Palestinians have denied this request, and Netanyahu has been criticized by many Israelis, too, for this demand. The Palestinians counter-argument, that Israel’s self-definition is not in their hands is fair enough. But it is not sufficient that their response makes sense, they should take active steps to respond to the concern that raised the demand.

In order to address this, the negotiations must be not exclusively over the West Bank, not even merely about the 1967 territories, but between the Israeli government as the sole representative of the Jewish people’s national body, and between a Palestinian body that represents all Palestinian people. I am not concerned with a minority of dissenters. Neturei Karta, Boyarin and Chomski don’t consider Israel to represent the Jewish people as a national entity. Fine. The world was willing to accept the Zionist representation between the 1920s and the 1940s, and that’s what counted. Something of that equivalent is necessary among the Palestinian people, so that when the Israeli government negotiates an end-deal with them, it is accepted internationally that this body speaks for the Palestinian refugees all over the Middle-East; for residents of the occupied territories in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and for Palestinians who are Israeli citizens. This body will have the mandate to negotiate compensation for refugees (without calling for their relocation in Israel); to negotiate swap of land within Israel and Palestine (including Liberman’s interesting proposal to transfer some of the “Triangle” to Palestine) and the agreement reached will face less fears of future demands. I have heard some argue that the Fatah is precisely that. I don’t know enough about Palestinian politics to determine if this is true, or even about the feasibility of such a body garnering support.

Despite the tongue-in-cheek title, I fully realize that these three points which I think are essential to alleviate Israeli concerns and fears are no minor issue. And since there is no likelihood of Palestinians and Arabs following up on these three points, there is little chance for peace. And with this little chance, we can expect things to go worse (gradually, as I expressed in my previous post), and should continue to demand that even without peace, Palestinians living under Israeli rule deserve all basic human rights denied to them today by Israeli martial law.

[I hate myself for publishing this post. As for questions of whether isn't there Israel can do to promote peace: I hope I adequately responded above. If not, here are a couple more responses: a. of course, if Israel obstinately refuses reasonable requests, such as the settlement freeze, it is an obstacle for progress. But on a more foundational level, I am not aware – and as always, this might be entirely my fault – of any concerns that Palestinians have regarding the aftermath of the two-state solution. Their concerns relate to the situation as it is, and that should definitely be addressed, according to international law and human rights, and even regardless of the two-state solution.]