Terrorism is a form of crime. Any ideology attached to it dignifies the terrorist with values that are not enfolded in his actions. Yes, some terrorists fight for just causes as liberation, independence, etc., but not all oppressed people turn to terrorism. It is morally and tactically wrong to justify or even mildly offer apologetics for the actions in the name of the cause. Quite the opposite: denounce the actions regardless of the cause, and support the just cause even if horrendous atrocities are done in its name. I don’t know of a western religion or ideology that has not had horrendous acts attached to it. The idea that some religions or ideologies are prone to atrocities more than others is unfounded.

By divorcing terrorism from crime, several battles are lost. The most important battle is the battle for freedom and human rights. More people were killed in Sandy Hook than in Boston, but Connecticut residents continued to travel freely. Paradoxically, the freedom discourse has only this week served to maintain the conditions that enabled Sandy Hook rather than limit them. When it comes to terrorism, citizens are willing to have their rights suspended much more than for stopping any other form of crime.

The special treatment of terrorism also allows for a glorification of terrorism. A psychopath gains more attention than a terrorist, and pundits speak of his ideology and his beliefs rather than denounce him as the despicable murderer that he is, no different than any other murderer.

Since terrorism is not conceptualized as any other crime, absurd linkages are immediately made, because people accept the false premise that this crime is founded by ideology. Thus ABC reports that “Boston Manhunt Shifts Immigration Debate,” as if the Marathon atrocities would have been more tolerable if they were performed by American citizen and Newtown High School Honors Student Adam Lanza. There is no connection between immigration, religion, or race and terror. A murderer is a murderer is a murderer. The twisted justifications the perpetrator affords himself for his deeds are a matter for himself, and perhaps for interested psychologists. There is no need to dignify these voices with the slightest credibility. Immigration is a question of balancing between economical needs and abilities of societies at large and between the aspiration of a free world, with as little restriction as possible on the movement of individuals. It should hardly be necessary to say that murderous acts are wrong, regardless of citizenship status, and that immigrants should be law-abiding as their hosts.

Terrorism is never an effective course to gain a goal, and most terrorist leaders should be smart enough to realize that (and are probably cynical enough to ignore it). It affords the terrorist’s enemy with the higher moral ground, and therefore is self-defeating. It is always self-defeating. Engaging with commentary on whether they have a point can only invite further terrorism. Whether the cause is justified or not is a question to be discussed in complete separation of terror, and while maintain a firm contempt to the terrorists.

Terrorism hysteria also gives a carte blanche for governments to create their Emanuel Goldsteins and restrict citizenship rights and human rights. No one dares to question that secret services are acting on behalf of the greater good, and their actions which habitually go unscrutinized are further obscured by the fog of war. Citizens should demand that security and defense forces do their best to serve and protect under the limitations of democratic rights. There is a price for this demand: terrorist attacks will occasionally occur. Just as traffic accidents occur, and trains derail, and people are murdered in broad daylight. It is a terrible truth, but these are the conditions in which we live. It is incomprehensible, unjustified and immoral, that the same week in which congress chooses to do nothing to restrict private ownership of guns, so many Americans accept a far-worse intrusion of their rights in the name of the war on terror. The war on terror and the war on crime should be merged. These are not wars to be won. These are not wars to be fought overseas. These are not wars that tarnish and dehumanize the collective image of groups based on individuals engaged by them. They only require the regular forces necessary to maintain peace and security for all. We do not need to learn of the biographies of murderers, hear their misguided ideologies, demands or justifications. There is no reason to engage with terrorism, understand it, or try to defeat it. Transform it in your mind to the heinous crime that it is, and think of it as no different than any other crime. Murderers should be stopped and brought to justice, nothing more.

A. Lapid and the Israeli Right

In July 2012 I wrote in my Hebrew blog that between Lapid and Kadima there are about 20 seats that will determine the fate of these elections, and unless they are shifted towards Labor, they will result in a second Netanyahu government, which seemed the most probable outcome. This was before Livni joined the race, and before the unanticipated betrayal of Peretz of the Labor party. So, I was wrong, but not by much. There were a little over 25 seats (number not yet final) there, more or less the same number that the exeunt Kadima gained in 2009.

The two main questions concerning Lapid’s success are (a) explanations for this success, and (b) expectations for the future. As for the former, I am wavering between two major options: the first is psychological and cultural. According to this explanation, his voters have low political awareness, their resilience too weak to face the difficult issues Israel is facing, and thus they escape by choosing a candidate who promises everything and nothing, who will undoubtedly disappoint them, just as his father did, just as Kadima did, just as the stillborn starlet party of the next elections is bound to disappoint them. They are lacanian, as they demand the Father, the chosen authority figure to pacify their fears, to promise them simple solutions, so that they can in due time be disappointed and rebel, replacing him with a new authority figure. To this psychological layer we must add a cultural layer: the elections were not Web 2.0 elections as many (most notably Eldad Yaniv) promised it to be, but Channel 2 elections. The old media is still the stronghold of Israeli politics, and reality-television audience want a news anchor or talk-show hosts to be the ruler who pacifies them, rather than the latest buzz (in the old sense of interference) from Facebook and Twitter.

But there is a second possible explanation, a sociological rather than the psychological/cultural. I was forced to engage in some sociological theory for an undergrad course on theories of religion recently, and thus reread some Marx and Durkheim, which have not informed my political thinking for some time. Rather than think of the individual Lapid voter, and his stupefied response as to why would he vote for someone so blatantly incompetent and inexperienced, I thought of the sector that voted for him. The Israeli wasps, so to speak, often called “the white tribe” or the “old elites,” Ashkenazi petite-bourgeoisie that shifted their support from the carcass of Kadima to Lapid, perhaps knew in the deepest non-verbal sense, what they were doing, and it was the best choice for them politically. Labor, with a fierce social-democratic agenda presents a threat to the petite-bourgeoisie (although only in theory, I believe). The right-wing parties strayed to extremes, epitomized with the joint run of Likud and Lieberman, and the inclusion of Feiglin in the list. The soft right has to correct itself in order to preserve its power. It is not unthinkable that both Lieberman and Feiglin will be blamed for the disappointing results, and the Likkud will be able to regain power, as the Pheonix Ariel Sharon always intended it to be.

Lapid’s evasion of any hard questions reflects the true will of the Israeli public. They do not want the Palestinians, not to engage with them, not to hear from them, not to see them, and certainly not to take responsibility for them, but they are not willing to pay the price of relinquishing control of the West Bank. This is true not only of the right wing parties, but of all Zionist parties, including Labor and Meretz. Read my old-time analysis of the Geneva Accord, orchestrated by Labor and Meretz veteran Yossi Beilin as a clear demonstration of this. Lapid promises that, and promises to do it with a smile and a quality of pragmatism, one that is unclear whether it is simple common sense or a cynical realpolitik.

The two explanations need not contradict each other.

As for the second question: Netanyahu will form the government with Lapid. That much was known from the night of the elections, despite fantasies of a left-wing government. It was even known as early as July, as I said, although I never anticipated such a success for Lapid. Lapid’s call for a broad government, with more than a hint that Labor should join, should be read alongside Netanyahu’s hint for a government that will form changes in regards to Ultra-orthodox conscription. Lapid knows he will not bring a reform in that area, just like his father did not (when Lapid Sr. was in a non-Haredi government with Sharon!), but needs an excuse. The best excuse is if Labor refuses to enter the government and Lapid is “forced” to sit with Shas, who in turn obstruct all his (non-)attempts to legislate ultra-orthodox conscription, providing the perfect excuse for the next campaign, perhaps even with a dramatic resignation from the government in a timely manner. Lapid’s success might hinder this excuse, as Netanyahu can form a coalition with Lieberman, Lapid, Bennet and no Shas, and Shas might not want to play the role Lapid is planning for it.

Conversely, I am considering a possibility that both haredi and right-wing politicians know they need to introduce conscription, to solve the entrapment that links conscription with the labor force, but the Haredi parties need to seem to be forced to do it against their will. The two options, unfortunately, can only be assessed with hindsight, once we see whether a reform passed or not.

Lapid expressed more than once his wish to have the Education ministry. The significance of his party allows him to demand one of the three major ministries, and Treasury is the best option there, although it has its obvious setbacks. Education might still be given to his number 2, Shai Piron, which will replicate the many years Mafdal ruled over education. The demand that Yael German, mayor of Hertzliya, should be appointed as minister of Interior Affairs, reflects the same sociological rationale for Lapid’s support. Shas has been toying too long with the ministry, and it needs a clean-up, by a dedicated municipal (and Ashkenazy) expert, as a correction, that will allow to abandon it in Shas’s hands again, in four years’ time (“abandon it” is a wrong phrase, perhaps, but “entrust” sounded worse). Regardless of which ministries are entrusted to Lapid’s party, he showed more than once that he has little patience for criticism and for nitty-gritty that goes beyond declarations. As such, it is quite likely he will be unable to maintain his position for more than one term. I can only hope that is not mere wishful thinking.

One more question that troubles the clairvoyants is whether Lapid’s party will be like Lieberman’s where everyone is completely loyal to the leader, or like Kadima, fraught by inner strife and constant threats of defection. The clue might be in the list of MKs that include some strong personalities. They might lead the way for others to Kadima-style politics rather than Liebermanesque loyalty. Or, Lapid’s party can once more take after its father’s, and erupt into opposing factions once it is clear they will not reproduce the success of the previous elections, and an excuse for the failure must be fabricated (Shinuy 2006).

One good thing must be said of Lapid’s party. It introduced the highest number of women in a single party, including the first Ethiopian woman to become MK. This is a true contribution to the Israeli Parliament which must be credited and thanked.

B. Maturation of the Radical Left

Many described the right-wing parties as united, while the left was unable to find a leader. There is very little truth in that. Lapid and Livni are hardly left, and “center” also does them disrespect. They are both right-wing both in their approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and their socio-economic views. Livni recruited some major Labor figures, but that only means her supporters had no idea what they were voting for, not that she was left. The radical left is what sets the tone for what Israelis consider Left. For example, people would generally assume that the left was against recent campaigns in Gaza. But Labor was never against them, and even Meretz supported Cast Lead in its initial stages. So it is obvious that the stereotype of Left in Israel is characterized by more radical acitivists than supporters of those parties. Many radical activists and pundits expressed in addition to their own endorsement, support for any vote of Labor, Meretz, Hadash and Da’am. Some omitted Labor, others omitted Da’am, others added Balad. Meretz and Hadash supporters, even though fighting over an overlapping pool of voters, had good things to say about each other. One did not find such generosity in the right.

This is a manifestation of a genuine understanding, resulting from the 2011 protest, that change will be brought by willing to enlarge the camp, to make concessions, to be in dialogue with those who are leaning to Zionist consensus and so forth. It accounts for the significant recuperation of Meretz, and hopefully will be a trend that sustains itself and increases numbers in the next elections, too.

The parties that did not survive the election threshold all reflect the converse fatal error: they promised that once they are in Parliament they would make great changes, but could not assure enough voters that they will find allies in the Israeli Parliament to promote their agendas. 3 seats is not enough to legalize Marijuana as Aleh Yarok promised, nor is it sufficient to drive away lobbyists, as Eretz Chadasha vowed to do. Voters of Meretz, Hadash and Labor were confident that regardless of their size, their representatives will forge alliances to promote their agenda, and thus were not intimidated by the possible success of these allies.

The new round of violence in Gaza occurs in essentially the same circumstances as operation Cast Lead so there is little to add analytically or morally.

As always, it is disheartening to see pundits and activists aligning along their pre-conceived positions, to spout childish accusations over who started it. When one does not know the identity of the author, the accusations sound remarkably the same: “terrorists attacking innocent civilians.”

As always, it is astonishing to see people relish in the distribution of horrific and violent images, presenting their prize evidence as decisive proof for the legitimacy of their stance.

Hence, as always, a reiteration of sound truisms is necessary, obstinately refusing to partake in the discourse of violence which inevitably stems from acts of violence:

 

Ethical stance

- Killing civilians is immoral and illegal. It doesn’t matter who started it, it doesn’t matter what was done before.

- Aggression against soldiers when not in battle is immoral and illegal. This was my stance in response to those who likened the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit as a legitimate act of resistance, as if he were a PoW; this is my stance to those who view the assassination of Jabari as a legitimate action of war.

- I oppose capital punishment in general, but it should be obvious that even those who condone it can only allow for it with due process. Otherwise, it is an immoral and illegal assassination.

- Basic human rights should be afforded to all inhabitants of Israel/Palestine, regardless of any agreement reached. This includes the right to security and shelter, food and welfare, education, freedom of speech, religion, and movement.

 

Political stance

- The wide discrepancy between IDF and Hamas should be noted. This is not a war between equals. In fact, it is not a war.

- As it is obvious that just like Cast Lead, this operation will not achieve a solution or even security for Israelis, it is not only immoral, as stated above, but also unstrategic. As such, I am consistently disappointed that in addition to the support of the quasi-left and center in Israel of such campaigns, it also gains the support of the right. More than anyone, they should be aware that limited campaigns do not contribute to their goal. They weaken their position that the conflict can be “managed” (let alone “won over”) through force, and weakens their ethical stance on the use of force.

- In order for the peace process to move forward, Palestinians must be united. Ideally, this will include also Israeli Palestinians, but the minimum requirement is the unification of West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians.

- Before and after any military campaign, basic human rights must be afforded to all Palestinians, as listed in the ethical stance, including free movement between Gaza and the West Bank, freedom of export, free transport through land, sea and air, no restrictions on anyone who wants to leave the strip for any reason, certainly not for those who wish to leave for purposes of study or hospitalization, but also for any other reason, or no reason at all.

 

Apologetics over the Palestinian condition in general is no justification and never will be. Nonviolent resistance will continue to be the only viable recourse to the success of their cause. This is not to deny the right to self-defense in battle.

 

Political analysis

Having offered my basic (and repeated) stances, I can only offer a few observations on the current round of violence.

- As noted by many, the campaign bears obvious inner-political motivations. This is, first and foremost, lamentable. I cannot imagine the simple impressionable mind of the voter who would change his views on major issues based on a single campaign. I am not denying the truth of it, merely admitting my complete estrangement from such a mindset. But however truth there is in this statement, one should be wary of reducing Israeli politics to an entirely “wag the dog” mentality. The short-sighted political benefits for Netanyahu do not come at the expense of the long-term benefit for Israel in the conflict as a whole.

- This benefit, namely, is maintaining Hamas as a legitimate power of resistance in the strip, and maintaining the situation of separation between Gaza Strip and the West Bank. This separation weakens the Palestinians, and forestalls any realization of a two-state solution (which is hardly likely anyway). This stance is a basic tenet of Israeli politics, that it can be found in various forms form Meretz to Lieberman. It does not have to assume the form of aggression. As noted in the past on this blog, those favoring negotiation with Hamas or simply taking a different route to the same goal: creating two weakened Palestinian entities which cannot unite and cannot amount to fully independent states.

- It is interesting, therefore, that Israeli leadership is spreading rumors of a possible ground invasion to Gaza. Of course, a ground operation does not necessarily entail control over the area at the end of the campaign, but Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz did say something to that extent in the past week, before the operation began. I have tried to find a way to harmonize that into Lieberman’s suggestion to Abas to withdraw his appeal to the UN, in return for an Israeli recognition of a Palestinian State (with borders to be decided), but I am not sure they comply. Several commentators have observed that Netanyahu might be “drawn in” to the strip, and I take this as another preparation of public opinion (dictated from PMO) of a ground operation, but again, cannot envision a full occupation (or reversal of the 2005 disengagement) as a result. It would seem unwise to occupy Gaza right before an election, and it also contrasts my view that Israeli leaders have perpetuated the separation of the WB from GS for so long. Netanyahu, of course, opposed the disengagement plan in rhetoric, but only after he voted in favor of it in the government. During Cast Lead I pointed out several times that Hamas rhetoric indicates they will not agree to have UN peacekeepers in GS (as PM Olmert forced them into Southern Lebanon two years before that), but would rather be reconquered by the IDF. The clear benefit for Hamas from an IDF occupation with the clear disadvantage to Israel from a WB-GS unification, makes this very clear.

- Therefore, most likely it will be a show. A show that has its immediate political benefits, a show that substantiates Hamas’s rule in the strip, airs out the leaders, and allows Israel to reshuffle the powers there, while reinstating it as the legitimate authentic resistance force to the occupation (contra Abas and PLO), and thus maintaining the separation. On Israel’s interest in Hamas leadership, see Aluf Benn’s excellent piece on Jabari as Israeli subcontractor.

 

As such, nothing new is to be expected.

Defense Minister Barak’s interview with Ari Shavit had the usual hallmarks of a Barak interview: a broad overview of strategic and political issues, a fair analysis available to the lay person, with as much details as a person in that position can allow to dispense. The unfortunate choice to interview anonymously with clues too thin to disguise his identity has been aptly reprimanded by Israel’s daily newspaper review, published on “The Seventh Eye” website, and were deciphered for those not familiar with Barak stereotypes by Noam Sheizaf. English version (limited to subscribers) is available here. I will be using the Hebrew original as my reference. Translations are my own. I will add that in my opinion Ari Shavit is a poor analyst with a debilitating penchant for hysteria and dramatization. Still, as a mouthpiece of the Defense Minister he did a good job, and asked important questions, without wasting time on trivialities that other journalists often hand to Barak allowing him to digress to non-issues. The entire interview, as printed, is succinct and of relevance. I think it is generally rare to find politicians who engage in analysis as part of their public discourse in such a frank manner, and Barak should be commended for it. For all his faults, this trait of his should be cherished while we have it. Given this trait of Barak, Shavit’s task was fairly simple, but I sensed that his questions did push Barak to say a little more, to the benefit of all readers.

The significance of the interview lies in two important explanations: Barak provided an explanation for the growing urgency for an attack in Israel, and he supplied a larger strategic-political context of such an attack, that could justify it politically, beyond the issue of nuclear power in itself. I should stress that my appreciation of Barak for sharing his analysis and motives should not be equated with endorsement. I will explain my contentions after summarizing Barak’s view.

Urgency, Israel vs. US: While Barak believes that a nuclear Iran will bring a greater imbalance to the world, and as such will be dangerous for the US, too, Iran poses a more direct threat on Israel. More importantly, however, is that the US can afford to wait another year, because it has greater power. Israel will be unable to act soon.

The moment in which Israel will be incapable is approaching. As far as the Americans are concerned, the Iranians are not even near the space of imperviousness. Because the Americans have bigger bombers and bigger bombs and the ability to repeat the attack several times. But for us, Iran might enter the space of imperviousness very soon. And when that happens, it will mean delegating to the United States something that is crucial to our existence. The State of Israel cannot afford that. It cannot entrust the responsibility to its security and its future even in the hands of its best and most-faithful allies.

 

Barak also dismissed the idea that the US will explicitly commit to attacking Iran within a year, if all else fails. He claimed that the US president does not know what will happen and what will be in six months, and therefore is incapable of truly making such a commitment. It sounded as if Barak was responding to specific suggestions, but I am not aware of who raised them. To be sure, such suggestions were raised by those who oppose an attack. It should also be noted that Barak commended the Obama administration as doing more through sanctions and diplomacy against a nuclearization of Iran than any former administration. While he conceded that the Americans can inflict much more damage on the Iranians than Israel can, it also sounded that he understands and accepts the conditions that prohibit the US from engaging in a military operation at this point.

 

The Bomb/Democracy entanglement: The interview begins with Barak naming four negative implications of an Iranian nuclear bomb: (a) It will cause a chain reaction, with nuclear arm races by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and more; (b) this proliferation (esp. in unstable countries) will lead to leakage of nuclear arms into the hands of non-state terrorist organizations; (c) it will give Iran a deterrent advantage against its neighbors; (d) it will furnish the Islamic regime with political strength, thus forestalling trends of democratization in the region.

In regards to the final point, Barak seems to delineate an intertwined relationship: the nuclear bomb will strengthen the Ayatollah regime, while a democratization of Iran will stall or annul Iran’s nuclear plans. Thus he says, in regards to the purpose of an Israeli operation:

The question that needs to be asked is what is the purpose of the operation. We are not deluding ourselves: our goal is not to eradicate the Iranian nuclear plan. But it is imperative to understand that the real story is the competition between the nuclearization of Iran and the fall of the current rule of the Ayatollahs in Iran. If we succeed in postponing the nuclear plan in six, eight or ten years, there is a good chance that the regime will not survive until the critical moment. So the goal is a delay. But even if you are right and the delay caused by an Israeli operation will only be of two years, that is not the end of the story. The sanctions will be removed for a while [because Israel will be seen as the aggressor, discussed previously in the interview –AA], but will later be returned, because the basic interest of the leading countries in the world to stop Iran will remain. For that reason the political pressure on Iran and the intelligence campaign against it will also be renewed. Ultimately, the combination of all these elements together will achieve the desired goal. The chance that the regime will collapse will increase significantly before Iran is nuclearized.

 

Aftermath of attack: the final lines of the last quote begin to touch on the possible aftermath of the attack. Barak fiercely rejects the allegations that Israel is willingly entering a war it cannot win to draw the US into a war it can win but does not want to fight. Anyone who has read Balaban’s Interpreting Conflict (Peter Lang, 2005), which is crucial for understanding Barak and also very useful for understanding various Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, will be able to supply Barak’s own response with the appropriate political analysis: a politician does not reach a decision based on the desired outcome, but takes into account other outcomes as well. Barak certainly realizes the benefits in store if the US decides to get involved, but his support of an attack must take into consideration other results, and especially the circumstances that will prohibit the White House from entering such a venture at this point in time. Interestingly, however, Barak does not anticipate a full-scale war with Iran. A harsh retaliation from Iran might drag the US to respond, despite its preference to stand aside. Therefore, while some retaliation is to be expected, perhaps in the form of Hamas or Hezbollah attacks from the north and south, Barak seems to assume (but not in a complacent manner, in any way) that the response will be limited, contrary to some very grave predictions:

What characterizes the Iranians all along is caution and patience. No-one knows what they will do if attacked. But based on past behavior, it is more likely that they will prefer to reinforce their safety systems even more, and to proceed with even greater caution. The will also fear an American intervention. While Israel can only perform a surgical operation to delay their nuclearization , the United States can operate in a way that will threaten the stability of the regime.

 

Response and dissent: I agree with much of what Barak said. One should not heed ultra-nationalist voices of pride, as if Israel can act in isolation or with disregard to other countries. Israel’s reliance on its alliance with the US is a major component of its security strategy, but cannot become the sole component.

We live in an Orwellian world, where sometimes the peacemaker needs to use his weapons. It does not seem to me improbable that among those who oppose an attack there are some who realize this means Iran will remain a backward country led by fundamentalists. At the same time, one should not expect too many peace or democracy opportunities to arise from military action. This sort of strategy has a limited affect, due to the limited (and violent) vocabulary of its language.

I think Barak’s arguments are wrong based on two fallacies: the first is the chain reaction, which he attributes solely to Iran’s attainment of nuclear weapons. It is unclear why Turkey, Saudi-Arabia, Egypt and others need to wait for a nuclearization of Iran for this race to begin. One obvious response to that is that they will have an excuse (especially Saudi-Arabia and Turkey, being directly threatened by Iran’s weapons). Another reason is perhaps that if they see the US does not prevent a nuclearization of Iran they will consider it an assurance for themselves, whereas now they are “sitting it out,” or even fearful of estranging the US. However, a US attack on Iran can prevent it from attacking other countries, since it cannot commit to bombing nuclear facilities every other year. The war in Iraq is one of the main causes for the US’s hesitation of intervention at this point, and an attack on Iran will similarly forestall future attacks. There is an accumulative element here, which the US cannot disregard. Therefore, a US attack on Iran can possibly motivate a new nuclear plan by another power, rather than discourage it.

This also leads to the second, and major fallacy of Barak’s argument: his silence on Israel’s own nuclear power. The US will be unable to bomb every nuclear plant in the Middle-East and continue to ignore Dimona. As long as Israel has nuclear weapons, it affords every Arab country with a readily-prepared motivation, in search of a balance of terror. Barak’s outlined strategy would have made much more sense if it was accompanied with willingness to denuclearize Israel, or at least to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to allow IAEA inspectors in Israel. Without such measures, the shadow of a nuclear Middle-East, against which Barak warns and rightly so, will continue to hover over our heads.

It should be noted, in this context, that a denuclearization of Israel does not weaken it significantly, just as the Arab claims for a quest of balance with Israel are insincere. Barak calls attention to this when alluding to a decade-old speech by Iranian leader Rafsanjani:

He [Rafsanjani – AA] says there is no balance between the Muslim World and Israel, and therefore there will also be no balance of terror. Israel is not a super-power holding an area of a continent. It is not even Japan, which became a world power only 15 years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Israel is a one-bomb state. One atom bomb will make Israel cease being what it is and what it was intended to be. One bomb is sufficient to end the Zionist story. On the other hand, says Rafsanjani, the Muslim World has one and a half billion people and dozens of countries. Even if Israel delivers a severe blow to the country that attacked it, Islam will endure. A nuclear will not bring about the disappearance of the Muslim World, but will be detrimental to Israel.

 

It is unclear whether Barak accepts this analysis of Rafsanjani, but I nevertheless laud him for raising it in Israeli media. I have said it on several occasions: Israel cannot win a nuclear war, and therefore has no need for nuclear weapons (for example, here). The only purpose the nuclear weapons serve now is as justification for other countries in the Middle-East to pursue nuclear power. To improve its strategic as well as its moral stance in the region and in the international arena, Israel should voluntarily disarm itself from nuclear weapons, while continuing to advocate for a denuclearized Middle East. Diplomatic and military efforts will then be justified and balanced.

As a side-point, it is also interesting to note that Barak wishes for a change of regime in Iran, and considers it a possible advantage for Israel. Unlike the common Israeli fears from the Arab Spring, the “Persian Summer” – as Barak labeled his wishful thinking – is anticipated to bring democracy since it will be a response to an already Islamist regime. If this is true, the rise of Islamism in other Arab countries (currently in Egypt, and possibly also in Syria in a still foreseeable future) might be a phase, of various durations, but notwithstanding a mere phase en route to democracy. One is allowed to hope. But the fact that was considered for many years the only democracy in the Middle East is to date the only country in the region to have nuclear bombs still leaves room for doubt regarding the linkage that Barak offers between the regime and its nuclear plan. The recent changes in the Middle East likewise prove that a change of regime is merely one step. The goals and tasks a regime sets for itself are decisive. The Israeli government should not stop short of preventing a nuclearization of Iran, and pursue a wider goal of a denuclearization of the region. It certainly has the power as well as the incentive to lead in this direction.

 

In addition to the interview with Ehud Barak cited above, I have also benefitted from the following studies in preparation of my article:

 

Sherrill, Clifton W. “Why Iran Wants the Bomb and What It Means for US Policy.” Nonproliferation Review 19.1 (2012): 31-49.

Morton, Jeffrey S. and Nicole Shortt. “The Arab Spring: Implications for Israeli Security.” Mediterranean Quarterly 23.3 (2012): 34-51.

The recent election of Mofaz as Kadima leader recalls his endorsement of negotiations with Hamas, which does not seem to suit his image as a hardliner general. Reconciling the two does not require an elaborate conspiracy plan, but rather a willingness to abandon false dichotomies and seriously consider the implications of any given situation or maneuver.

I explained my position on Hamas negotiations almost four years ago, but this is a good opportunity as any to revisit it, and reiterate some basic tents of my views. In short, I examine any step of Israeli-Palestinian \ Israeli-Arab peace process in light of two things: (a) what presuppositions are assumed regarding each side and the nature of the conflict; and (b) what is the likely result of the proposed step (in contrast to its professed purpose).

All supporters of negotiations with Hamas have not added any stipulation that such negotiations assume Hamas as sole representative of the Palestinian people. It follows, that supporters of negotiations with Hamas assume Israel proceeding in at least two separate axes: a PLO axis, negotiating the future of the West Bank, and a Hamas axis, negotiating the conditions of the Gaza strip.

Such a division weakens the Palestinian position on both fronts: Palestinian leaders from the West Bank (Abbas, Fayyad, Erekat, etc.) will be in a disadvantaged position to negotiate a full peace process with Israel. They will not be able to agree to a formula of conclusion of all demands, when two million of their people are not part of the final agreement. Equally, any solution concerning the refugees will not include the dwellers of the refugee camps in Gaza, leaving the refugee solution not entirely solved [this, theoretically, is disadvantageous for Israel as it is for the Palestinians, but I set that aside for now]. Finally, assuming some agreement on Palestinian independence in the West Bank is reached, previous suggestions to connect the West Bank and Gaza Strip (via tunnel, bridge, highway, etc.) and especially those suggestions which impaired Israeli sovereignty will be put aside, since Israel could (and would be likely to) claim that so long as the Palestinian party of the negotiations does not control Gaza, it cannot vouch for the security of this corridor. As for negotiations with Gaza leaders, all these apply, and much more, since an independent state in Gaza alone is hardly viable, let alone the severely diminished quantity of land, and Israel is unlikely to tolerate two independent Palestinian states on its borders.

I contend that most supporters of negotiations with Hamas realize this, and support it precisely because it is an excellent tool to weaken Palestinians, while professing a compromising and liberal stance to the inattentive Westerner. This can be counteracted by demanding a supporter of negotiations to support unconditional free movement between Gaza and the West Bank, and\or to stipulate that prior to negotiations with Hamas, Israel will only negotiate with one agreed representative of the Palestinian people. Refusal to these conditions should assume that the supporter of negotiations with Hamas supports them primarily in the context of Palestinian disunity.

Finally, the question of weakening Palestinians as a strategic and tactic method needs to be addressed: Israel’s military, financial, industrial and intellectual knowledge over the Palestinians should be understood as undisputable. Assuming that Israel needs to maintain – or even increase! – this gap while approaching a peace process is a grim misconception. Nothing could be farther from the truth. For peace to be achieved concessions should be made, and it logically, as well as morally, ethically and strategically, follows that the stronger side is the side to make the concessions. Palestinian unity and strength is a principal imperative on the road to true peace. For me, it is clear that this unity of representation must include not only disenfranchised Palestinians living under Israeli occupation in Gaza Strip and the West Bank, but also Palestinian diaspora, and Palestinian Israelis. If this cannot be achieved, a lasting peace will not be achieved. But going in the opposite direction, of fragmenting even the shaky unity of the West Bank and Gaza, is not a solution. Granted, Israel does not assume responsibility for inner-Palestinian conflicts. At the same time, Israel has controlled many aspects of Inner-Palestinian politics, and continues to control major elements of possibilities of unity (such as free transportation between Gaza and the West Bank). Israel’s initiatives should be directed not towards manipulating these control-points in ways that are favorable to its stance (regardless of disagreements on what this would be), but rather on withdrawing and relinquishing these points, so that all inner-Palestinian politics remain truly an internal matter. Once again, in this matter as in many others, Israel’s first step towards peace needs to be a role of relinquishing power and refraining from manipulations.

The New York Times ran on its website a fascinating debate on Israel’s Nuclear Power, and the possibility of denuclearization, especially as part of the efforts to stop Iran from attaining nuclear weapons.

Before entering the debate, we must remember and accept the terms under which it is taking place: (a) Israel has never admitted to having nuclear weapons; (b) Iran claims that it’s nuclear project is not intended for military purposes; (c) Iranian leaders have explicitly questioned the right of Iran to exist; (d) Israel has claimed it would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East; (e) Iran, which does not share a border with Israel, is about 75 times larger than Israel, with over 600 thousand square miles to Israel’s 8500 (including the territories, as I don’t know that a nuclear bomb will be able to distinguish it), and with a population that is almost ten times the size of Israel.

I disagree with Gordis’s claim that “If Iran is a rational actor, the only factor preventing its attacking Israel is Israel’s second-strike capacity.” If Iran is a rational player, it will also take into account that after destroying Tel Aviv with a nuclear bomb, it is doubtful that Israel will ever recover, whereas Iran’s size (area and population) severely damages the danger of serving a comparable blow through a “second-strike.” And this is merely the tactical question, having not introduced yet the moral debate whether the destruction of a one million people metropolis (Tel Aviv) justifies an after-the-fact revenge with the destruction of a 13 million populated metropolis (Tehran). In fact, the major deterring power of Israel’s nuclear weapons is against the loss of sovereignty through a conventional war, as Dayan is alleged to have done during the Yom Kippur war (1973). But this impact is annulled if we assume Israel’s claim that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the ME is said in earnest.

Back to Gordis: if Iran is a rational player, it will not only be able to take all of this into account, reducing the fear of an Israeli “second-strike”, but also the international impact of such an attack on Israel, even if Israel does not hold nuclear weapons. In sum, if Iran is a rational player, it will know that with nuclear power it can practically destroy Israel, whereas Israel can severely damage Iran but not destroy it, and it will know that implications of an unprovoked nuclear attack on Israel will have grave implications regardless of Israel’s nuclear weapons.

Therefore his rhetorical questions that ensue also fail logically: if Iran is a rational player, the moral compass of “Israel” in comparison to Ahmedinejad’s is hardly an issue, because rational players are not concerned with moral compasses, but rather with securing their interests in the best way possible.

The lamentable repeated evocation of the Holocaust does not serve the debate, precisely for the reason mentioned above. Any mass destruction cannot be justified, even if as a revenge, and thus if anything is to be derived from the Holocaust (I argue not), it is that Israel should not hold WMD in any case: it would not use them initially, as Gordis himself admits, and it should not use them after the fact.

Similarly, Wurmser’s position that Israel’s nuclear weapons serve as a compensation for past and future “land for peace” settlements does not stand to tactic or ethical reasoning. As Zeev Maoz demonstrates, in the best piece in the debate, Israel’s current and future concerns of terrorism have not and cannot be solved through nuclear deterrence, and Iran has done more damage to Israel through its endorsement of Hamas and Hezbollah, than through its nuclear program, especially if we assume it to be a rational player (and any other assumption annuls the cause for the debate).

Wurmser’s position returns to old pre-1967 debate where those opposing the pursuit of nuclear power (eg Alon and Rabin) favored territorial depth as a security assurance. In reality, those who did not support the nuclear project never took any major measures to stop it, and this is especially notable after 1967. Whether Israel has a “narrow waist” without the West Bank or not, Iran is unlikely to drop a bomb on Jerusalem, which would endanger al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock, and an assault on Tel Aviv would be decisive, as I said, with the deterrence of the second-strike playing a lesser role than it is accredited. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Syrian-Israeli conflict over land and sovereignty need to be addressed as entirely separate matters than the nuclear question. The compensation that nuclear power serves for loss of land is a strategic fiction, a fairy-tale that has been long ready for the trashcan of history.

For practical purposes, Wurmser is not that different from Micah Zenko’s argument, who promotes here the view that Haaretz readers have become familiar with through the columns of Avner Cohen, unquestionably the world’s leading expert on Israel’s history of nuclear power. Essentialy, Zenko and Cohen claim that accommodations should be made to allow Israel to officially hold nuclear weapons, for these to be supervised, and eventually for a nuclear balance of terror to be established in the Middle East. The major difference is that Cohen and Zenko admit that this will be the result, whereas Wurmser opposes denuclearizing Israel, but does not admit the obvious, summarized by Maoz “Israeli nuclear monopoly in the Middle East is not sustainable over the long run.” Supporting nuclear power for Israel, is supporting a nuclear Middle East. For reasons which should be obvious by now, I contend that a nuclear Middle East weakens Israel, rather than strengthen it.

The inner debate in Israel on an attack on Iran, has roughly been along the lines those who oppose the attack and support a nuclear Israel, and those who support the attack, and supposedly oppose Israeli nuclear powers – Barak is considered to be a follower of Rabin in this, and other respects, such as the disdain for the Oslo process. However, as I said, there is little reason to assume that those who think that originally Israel should not have pursued nuclear power will actually do anything in the direction of denuclearization.

Furthermore, there is serious room for concern whether such an attack can stop the Iranian nuclear program (or merely postpone its achievements for a couple of years). If this is the case, the price of a conventional missile war following the attack seems too high. There is a possibility that Israel is not planning to attack, and that the heightened discussions are intended to motivate others for action. The explicit action is supposedly a US strike on Iran, but if this is the game played, it is not unthinkable that it is also inviting pressure to either come out of the closet or to denuclearize. Mya Guarnieri seems to point in that direction from one way, in which a pre-emptive strike (not just talk, but an actual strike) will accelerate the Iranian program. It is clear from the debate, that nuclear powers held by Iran will allow Israel to “come out of the nuclear closet,” as Zenko called it, and in line with the claim that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East.

Maoz’s suggestion, to use the fact of Israeli nuclear power as a bargaining chip in pushing towards a nonproliferation treaty for the entire Middle East is highly interesting, and the only possibility of bringing forth sweetness out of the strong. It should be remembered, that Iran has additional concerns and rivals other than Israel when developing nuclear weapons, and despite this simple binary, Israel may not actually hold the prize that will push Iran in this direction. It is also obvious that Israel has possessed nuclear weapons for decades without admitting it, a nonproliferation treaty cannot assure that there will actually be no weapons. But since there is no strategic, tactic or ethic justification for Israel’s nuclear power – as I contend – then even using it to reach a declarative achievement by the countries of the Middle East is no light matter.

My project on separation has taken an interesting turn in the past few months. First, heightened attention was drawn to the absence of women in street ads in Jerusalem. Then, further attention was directed to gender-segregated buses. Some clashes between secular and ultra-orthodox crowds led Israeli Prime-Minister Netanyahu to consider (or at least, declare he is considering) a partition of Beit-Shemesh to two municipalities: a secular one and an ultra-orthodox one. To top it off, Yad La-banim – an organization dedicated to the commemoration of fallen soldiers – was reported to request the Israel Land Administration for land in order to establish a settlement whose residence would all be bereaved families.

The first issue is hardly new. Even my own marginal blog has mention of it from three years ago. The folly of gender-segregated buses is nearing a decade. The idea of segregated settlements based on common interests of the residents is probably the oldest news in this series (I mentioned it in relation to a piece by Shmuel Rosner in the JRB).

Before proceeding, I should recall that I entitled my project “Separation as Condition and as Solution”. I agree that separation can be and should be a solution at times. When formulating our opinions on separation, it is essential that every analysis will include not only notice, but also reflections on when one accepts / condones / encourages separation. My ready example is formulated in the following question: why is it clear to us that gender-segregated public toilets are a necessity, and gender-segregated buses are an abomination? To make it more interesting, ask yourselves where should one place orthodox synagogues in this array.

Furthermore, I note the seeming tension between my strong advocacy of separation of church and state, and my stark objection to the separation of secular and religious communities and individuals. This is only a seeming tension, because in fact they are one and the same.

Yearning for similarities and heterophobic attempts to conceal the presence or avoid contact with one’s Others, is most likely not peculiar to Israel. Yet, the growing acceptance of separation as the best course of solution, should be of great concern. Further homogenous towns of Ultra-Orthodox communities will not alleviate the secular-religious tensions of Israeli society, but will distance them to a further extreme. Similarly, the psychological effects of an entire settlement fraught by bereavement are surely the worst course of coping with one’s loss. The idea is far from realization, and one can hope it will be stopped at early stages, but the fact that it arose is the significant part: more and more Israelis wish to live with their peers, and as they succeed in doing so, the definition of “peers” becomes increasingly narrow. Not only of the same ethnic group (separate settlements and towns for Jews and Arabs), not only similar ideologies (the ultra-orthodox towns and neighborhoods serve as a good example, as do the West Bank settlements, but also many Kibbutzim who are no longer communal, and preserve a community comprised mainly of left-wing voters), now also for similar life experiences.

A living, healthy community needs to promote accessibility and coexistence. Learning to live with Arabs, Religious Jews, non-Jewish immigrants and refugees, disabled people and the elderly (to mention the main excluded groups of Gush Dan) would enhance tolerance. Segregation and exclusion generate a reality in which people truly believe that they can only live among their peers, that anything else would be hazardous. To repeat myself once more, the difference between ultra-orthodox communities in the diaspora and in Israel demonstrates that well, although even on them Israeli ultra-orthodox reality has had a negative effect.

The social tensions in Israel can (and should) be alleviated through platforms of dialogue, and opportunities to practice tangible coexistence. I don’t see this government, or any other feasible constellation, promoting such platforms nor furnishing such opportunities. Hence, a vicious circle: Israelis will grow more and more isolated from those different from them, and in turn will elect representatives who carry such a message.

The excitement over the possibility of another midstream party led by Yair Lapid is interesting to contemplate in this connection. Lapid, supposedly, appeals to Israelis of various groups. Thus, one could argue against me that his immediate success in the polls (which still needs to be measured at the ballot), shows that Israelis are not caved in small groups, but actually long for a wide consensus. To understand how Lapid’s vision complies with my previous comments, one must realize that this search for a consensus is in itself, ironically, an exclusionary practice. The consensus-cravers do not like extremists on any side. They are wary of ideologists who hold strong convictions, as they are wary of anyone who is different. The search for a consensus takes for granted that Palestinians and Ultra-Orthodox are outside of the consensus, although they are willing to embrace those who go to extreme efforts to belong, despite their “inherent otherness”.

Coexistence, on the other hand, is cosmopolitan by nature. It does not impose demands of compatibility, but seeks to create a joint public space for everyone, the centerfield consensus, and the marginal others. This public space, that is suited for most, is not something easy to achieve, of course. However, the summer protest movement inspired several forms of dialogue, and activities and demonstrations continue. Lapid is definitely trying to employ the protest to his own advantage, and he is expected to be successful to some degree, just as no-one could have expected the half-million demonstrators to fully comprehend what is at stake, and what are the correct paths to improve their conditions.

Lapid is a symbol and a symptom, he might be pleased to know. Had he not decided to become a politician, someone else would have tried to appeal to Israeli consensus. If he gets 5 or 15 seats, his party will still vanish within two or three election runs, as do all midstream parties. Israelis who fear to be different, and fear those who are, will continue to vote to such parties, rather than take a firm, brave stand.

However, artificial separation is always temporary. Eventually, reality imposes itself, for better or for worse.

Revolutions which occur overnight usually succeed in instating someone new in power, but do not cause an enduring change. Supports of the “Occupy” movement should not expect a quick change, but rather consider this as a long-term commitment towards a cultural change.

For this change to occur, it has to be in every level of life. It needs to be reflected in your daily dealings as you travel to work, the way you treat your co-workers, your superiors and inferiors, strangers on the street. It needs to be everywhere. Even in your mind. The way you think about things.

I saw a lot of people talking about how Occupy Wall Street is spreading to the world on Saturday. They mentioned Madrid. Wrong. Demonstrations in Spain have been going long before OWS began. Occupy Wall Street would not have started if it were not for millions of Arabs taking to the streets and demanding change. Change begins with the way we think: everyone is excited to see Americans rising for change, because corporate America has been exporting and spreading its wrong values of consumerism for many years now. But that doesn’t mean it began on Wall Street. If Americans think that success of OWS is measured in numbers, and in the way the world is copying them, they are replicating corporate ways of thought. They are, inadvertently, being part of the problem, not the solution.

Forget American exceptionalism. “Occupy” is about changing corporate culture, so accept you have something to learn from the world. Reappropriate “globalism” so it embraces dialogue and cultural diversity, rather than restricted to monetary gains of high-cost export (software, films) and low-cost import (textile, and every other production-line object).

Abandon cool/uncool binaries. American consumerism thrives on things falling out of fashion to drive people to buy the next cool thing. Defy this way of thought by refusing to discuss whether the protest is cool or not, and by declining to comment on specific photos of protestsers, as if a person can be reduced to being “hot” or “not”. Talk deep ideas of values, rather than shallow designations.

Financial inequality is a major problem in the US and around the world, but money was never an end in of itself. Money is means. The force driving corporate greed is much stronger than the actual money they have, and if you seek to change that, you need to begin by changing that way of thought in your own life. Don’t judge people based on what they have or how they look. Embrace diversity of tastes, appearances, styles. As long as it is not hurting anyone, it’s not bothering me.

That being said, you should have a taste for aesthetics. Corporate culture has compromised America’s architecture and public landscape. Look at maps and photos of 19^th century, early 20^th century New York. Look at buildings from before 1900 and after. Envision Main Street as it was before the gigantic label malls. Yes, one had less choice in the only fashion store on their hometown’s Main Street, but they knew their seller. They had a more comprehensive experience than when buying at a megastore, being no more than means of transport of their cash, taking it out in one ATM machine, and depositing it again with another cashier. Times Square is ugly, dominated by glistening signs and billboards asking you to buy. It has no sense of beauty, no hint that it is aware of all the beauty in our world. Defy this. Denounce it. We want to live in public spaces with art. Created by humans, for the pleasures of the human eye. Not oppressive ads keeping our body-image low, and telling us how better our lives would be if only we bought this or that product.

Money can be used to create such art. It can be used to improve the transportation system and the education system. Tom Friedman wrote a few years ago:

If all Americans could compare Berlin’s luxurious central train station today with the grimy, decrepit Penn Station in New York City, they would swear we were the ones who lost World War II.

That is what is wrong with corporate culture. Not the statistics of how many people have how much of the money, but what it is being used for. Corporate culture has driven down American public life to compromise on quality for the sake of quantity, to accept deteriorating standards of all basics of infrastructure: a decrepit transportation system, a sub-functional health system, and a deteriorating education system. Improving these is by far more important than making a handful of rich people a little less richer.

“Occupy” needs to focus on these themes. People need to feel free to share their demands, and voice them on the street, on the virtual street of the Social Networks, in their homes, and through the media. This is true democracy, exercising freedom of speech and demanding equality and justice for all.

At the same time, Occupy supporters must find ways to abandon corporate culture. Avoid numbers, discuss values. Denounce those who refer to your age, your looks, your clothes, as they are oppressed and oppressive entrapped in a culture of shallowness.

Celebrate dialogue, listen respectfully to those who oppose you, and see if there is any room for common ground. Israeli Social Protest movement, organized a community even in Tel Aviv, of discussion tables. All tables were diverse by age, social class, religious beliefs, political party. Everyone listened respectfully to others, as they shared with total strangers their hopes from the movement. Occupy would do well to organize such events across major cities and small towns in the US.

Change will come if you change your own life-style. Reject corporate news, reject sensationalism, substitute consumerism for buying things you need, when you need them. There are plenty of websites with good tips on how to change this, and these should be made available and promoted to all supporters.

Eventually, in order to achieve enduring change, Occupy will need to play the political game. Hopefully, we will see change in politics, in US policy towards pollution and Global Warming, towards nuclear weapons, regulations and taxation of corporates, dissolving the legal fiction that corporates are individuals with rights, and much more. But that is extremely long-term. Very far away. Until that happens, and before that happens, we as individuals need to dissociate ourselves from corporate culture of reckless consumerism.

Rabin

The demonstrations in Tel Aviv on Saturday night had a lot in common with the spirit of the week following Rabin’s assassination. Tweets, signs, and speeches, all shared a rhetoric that was attributed in the fall of 1995 to the “Candle Youngsters” (No’ar ha-Nerot). At some point I realized that many of the protesters were the Candle Youngsters. Many, of course, are younger, and were little children at the time. But still, I think that something of that spirit is hovering over the protest. The ethos that by going out to the streets ad speaking out in the name of a nation you can lead change; and also a sense of duty, of a task unfulfilled. The anger and frustration of the demonstration are, in part, a backlash to the solemnity that characterized the Candle Youngsters. It would be a wonderful historical irony if the Candle Youngsters were to bring Netanyahu down, a mere 16 years after they failed to stop his rise to power.

Tahrir

This is not to deny the effect of the Arab Spring, another splendid manifestation of the power of the people when they go out on the streets. Some people are aware of the connection and proud of it (holding signs bearing the comparison), others are surprise and even offended by it. This debate is important, because it encapsulates Israelis’ attitude to their surroundings. Are they willing to accept that their neighbors are humans who share the same basic concerns they do? Are they willing to concede that Egyptians realized something several months before they did? That they actually might learn something from dialogue and openness to their environs?

Comparisons, as always, are worthless if they do not contain an element of contrast. Tahrir and Rothschild are both the result of personal, everyday strife. I guess it is ultimately impossible to motivate so many people without such concerns. Tahrir had a demand and a target which was straight-forward, measurable and compressible into one sentence. Israeli protest has demands that are complex, draw a plethora of contradicting solutions, and require full-scale change of priorities and procedures, rather than the change of government. You might think that switching from tyranny to democracy would be harder than sticking with democracy and shifting those in power, but the hard truth that Israelis are learning, is that a removal of a single dictator is more visible and measurable than shifting the entire structure of a socio-economic system.

Left or Right

Many are asking if this is a leftist protest, or national. That depends on what you mean by left. The demands for social justice, government intervention in housing prices (and other costs of living) are easily identified as classic left-wing goals. They rely on Israel’s past as a welfare state, and the ethos of its forefathers, Zionists who identified with the socialist dream to various degrees. There is no cause for surprise there.

On the other hand, the multitudes of demonstrators are not all of one mind and voice. There are plenty right-wing conservatives or liberals (in Israel, “liberal” is opposite of social-democrat, not of “republican” or “conservative”). They have either not thought through the means the government has to respond to their demands, or they simply are out to express their frustration. In any case, they are very likely to vote to right-wing parties again, and should the leaders of the protests draw connections to the Israeli-Palestinian  conflict, many of their followers will leave before you get a chance to say “September”. So, whether you are hoping or concerned that this protest will lead to the end of the occupation (depending on your politics), I am quite certain this will not happen, and there is no cause for panic or self-delusion (depending on my politics…).

Forming a Socio-Economic Stance

If there is any cause for optimism, and even here I would be extremely careful, it is in the possibility to diversify and nuance Israeli political discourse, so as to allow people to identify themselves as "social lefties" but "right-winged foreign policy" and vice versa.

Holding a socio-economic opinion is based, as any political view, on one’s personal experiences. What would you do if your health insurance was covered regardless of how much you worked, indeed of whether you worked? is it fair that some people work hard all their lives, and still don’t have money to buy a house or pay for a new pair of glasses? What measures of rectifying this would be unfair to others, who are more well-off? Who is to blame for people being poor, and what is the best way the government can help them get out of it? What is the worst way? The practical solutions can be debated, but people need to form their own opinion on such questions, and debate them with others.

These questions might seem rehash of old, endless and pointless debates to American readers. for the most part, they are unheard in Israel, even amidst the Social Justice Protest. I think such debates are a sign of a healthy political system (not the only sign, of course, and not to idealize the American system in any way), and even more than that – they’re plain interesting! So – I hope a culture of socio-economic debates will linger after the protests are over and forgotten.

Forgetfulness

Yes, despite all the excitement of the past few days, there is still more than a fathomable chance that the protests will be over by September, some changes will be made supposedly in response to the demands, but only enhancing Free Market economy in Israel. By the next elections, everything will be back to normal. Netanyahu is a fan of Reagan and Thatcher. He may well have learned from Thatcher that all he needs is to brave the protests, until they blow over, and then continue with his new financial order.

The Ever-Expanding Israeli Middle-Class

The protesters are right, I believe, that more regulation, planning and intervention could ease the cost of living and aid struggling Middle Class families. But one thing no-one is talking about, is that Israel is consistently dissolving its Working Class. The Middle Class is absorbing more and more households, and this brings down salaries.

Zionist revolution included in its ethos a transformation of the Jewish people from Middle-Class merchants, to working people. This ethos informed the agricultural Kibbutzim and moshavim, as well as industries in the cities. This is rapidly diminishing. I am always weak when it comes to numbers, so I won’t pretend to know them, but most professional schools, training teenagers for industry jobs closed by the end of the previous millenium. Manual labor was gradually handed over to Palestinians since 1967, and when that was no longer viable (starting in the early 1990s), more and more laborers were brought from the Balkans, Africa, China, Thailand and the Philippines. More and more Israelis are getting college degrees, and will do anything but manual labor.

The problem, of course, is that no-one (almost) wants to do manual labor. I’d be a hypocrite advising people to degrade their social status and income, when I’m not willing to do the same myself.

But there are measures the government can take to encourage a creation of a native working class:

- Limit number of working permits for foreigners.

- Increase punishment and enforcement for employers of workers without permits

- Increase punishment and enforcement for employers who do not pay minimum wages.

- Limit number of degrees universities and colleges can award each year (esp. in the “practical fields” of Law and Business Management, but also across the board). There is no point with having so many people who invest three-four years of their lives, and at least $10,000 expecting their degree to improve their socio-economic status, only to be faced with the sad truth that employers are not impressed by a BA anymore. The limit will force Higher Education institutions to set a higher bar (this can be coupled with higher demands for the degree itself), and will discourage people from pursuing a degree without passion. At the same time, more options need to be provided for accessible, and affordable (or free!) non-degree courses for those interested in learning, li-shma, for its own sake. Knowledge is a wonderful thing. Confusing knowledge with a depreciating college degree is bad news for everyone.

I’m not even trying to conceal that I thought more about the last condition than the others. I am in Higher Education, and its problems and challenges occupy me more than other things. But the growing Middle Class is one of the biggest unspoken problems in Israel. Foreign workers stay and raise children, who see themselves as Israelis, and will not continue with the menial labor of their parents. They will pursue college degrees and Middle Class jobs as well. So more foreigners will have to be brought in. The cosmopolitan-humanist in me would like to say, “let them in! who cares?” but things are never that simple in Israel. It can work in the US, although I am not thrilled about it there either, but the US is big enough and its ethos inclusive enough to allow for it. Also, unlike Israel, Americans have conquered their problems of First Nations. Israel will not be able to continue as a state privileging Jews, and discriminating two other groups. I wonder, and I am sure this is not original but have not studied it in depth either, if there are connections to be made between the abolition movement, and a feeling that the threat of Native Americans has been terminally removed.

Heavy Competition

Netanyahu has said more than once that his proposed solution for reducing the cost of living, is opening the market to competition, thus bringing prices down. The practical implications are more import, less produce and industry, less Israelis working in agriculture and factories, and Israel relying more and more on the cheap labor of third-world populations (marketed, perhaps, by elegant European / North-American brands). In addition to the fact that this ties in well with the previous point, it also raises two further problems: a. this is not a solution that enfolds social justice. On the contrary. If the “People Demand Social Justice” as they chanted around the country last Saturday night, it cannot be achieved by injustice to those more remote and more invisible. Second, Israelis should consider very seriously if their stance in the Middle East, Europe and the Global community is such that will allow them to rely more heavily on overseas suppliers. Clue: not if you continue fearing BDS you don’t.

Dan Meridor’s personal notes from his diary during the Camp David talks published this weekend in Haaretz provide a fascinating peephole for the mundane details of negotiation, peacemaking, and politics.

Shortly after the failure of the Camp David talks and the outbreak of violence, I assumed that Barak, who was never pleased with the outcome, planned this all along. Most of what I read afterwards confirmed this premonition, including Barak’s repeated statements of removing the veil off Arafat’s face. If Meridor had any such impressions, they were left out of the sections of his diary that were published. His impressions of Barak depict a sincere effort to cut a deal and reach a peace agreement that lingered until the last day, and a grave disappointment when the talks fail. It is hard to believe that Barak went to Camp David with such a degree of naïveté – indeed, just as much as it is quite unbelievable that Meridor would buy it.

Nevertheless, thus the story Meridor provides us goes: Barak was willing to reach a compromise at Camp David over Jerusalem, one that the hardliners on his negotiation team (namely Meridor and Elyakim Rubinstein) opposed.

But even according to Meridor, the Clinton Parameters were not much different than what Barak was willing to offer Arafat during the talks. This raises once again the question of the US as a fair broker and its stance in relation to Israel, a question that concerned previous posts regarding Obama and Netanyahu. It is worthwhile considering the similarities between the Clinton-Barak relationship and the Obama-Netanyahu relationship in light of the seeming differences between the two. Indeed, Meridor tells of a rift between Clinton and Barak as well, but all the same, the American presidents align themselves to the Israeli line.

Presuppositions, insinuations and allegations of the power of the Jewish lobby are hardly in place as explanation. More interesting, and Meridor’s account confirms what most people have said previously, is that the Israelis laid concrete offers on the table, which were not reciprocated by Palestinian offers (most people, to exclude the famous Agha-Malley accounts that were published in NYRB at the time). In other words, the American president follows along the lines of the Israeli offer, because he has no counter-offer to try and balance it.

On the other hand, it was interesting to learn from the Meridor account that Barak and Arafat never met alone. In one section it comes across as Barak’s fault and insistence; in another, as Arafat’s.

One may assume that the timing of the publication of these notes is far from coincidental. Meridor notes that Barak claimed that if Arafat would unilaterally declare independence, he would unilaterally annex parts of the West Bank. Barak is once more the Minister of Defense (as he was at the time along with his position as PM), the minister responsible for the Occupied Territories. Once again, “threats” of a Palestinian declaration of independence are drawing attention around the world, gaining hope from left-wing Israelis and peace-activists, stirring concerns by others, and leading to various pressures and debates between Palestinians and World Leaders, and Palestinians and themselves. Arafat played the same trick several years earlier with Barak’s predecessor, Netanyahu, who is once again Prime Minister.

I enjoyed the mundane details, as I said: Meridor’s impression of his cabin; the fact that he shared a room with Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami (one would expect people of that stature to enjoy the privacy of their own room); Meridor’s conversation with and impressions of Chelsea Clinton; and his order not forward calls from outside the retreat, except from his wife (a prohibition that was bypassed by Israeli reporter Keren Neubach, leading Meridor to suspect she identified herself as his wife to the operator). Such sketches remind us that the fate of negotiations is ultimately in the hands of humans, infallible and limited like the rest of us.

I will continue to hold that Barak thought that another round of violence was unavoidable, and that undoing Oslo was good. But everything else remains open: to what end? What did Arafat hope to gain by that round of violence? What would Barak have done differently had he stayed in power, and after the Oslo agreements were de facto annulled? What would he have done had Arafat accepted the Clinton parameters? We may never know.